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Executive Summary 
 
The long wave of globalization will most probably lose part of its strength in the next 
few years. As a consequence inflation will not remain as low as it has been for the 
past three decades, where the growth strategy of emerging countries, especially China, 
has mainly relied on exports to the global market. The very success of this strategy 
implies that the western world would not still for long be able to pursue a growth 
strategy based on (excessively) cheap imports. A look at price indexes shows that 
inflation has been in the recent past on an upward trend and that it varies considerably 
across sectors. At the very least, the rate of inflation may become much more volatile 
in the decades to come. Besides the obvious consequence of actualizing its inflation 
target, the ECB should also rethink its policy (and its relationship with the other 
actors of economic policy in Europe) to put in place strategies aimed at 
accompanying the structural adjustment of the economy (that may be a cause of a 
slightly higher inflation). The increasing income inequality may also prove to be a 
problem for monetary policy, because it tends to generate stagflationary outcomes if 
it is not being taken care of. If the short term prospect is for the rate of inflation to 
decrease, the longer term prospect is that it may well decrease towards a new 
equilibrium rate higher that the preceding one which is reflected in the present 
objective of the ECB.  
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The recent evolution of commodity prices has raised a number of questions that are 
relevant for policy making in general, and for monetary policy in particular. The 
public debate has focused on the decreasing purchasing power of household – 
especially the poorest ones – and on the action economic policy makers should take in 
order to contrast this trend. This briefing paper will try to give elements to answer 
two questions. The first is whether we are heading towards the end of the era of 
(abnormally) low inflation that we experienced since the middle of the 1980s. The 
answer to this first question will be yes, as the structural factors that kept inflation 
lower in the past are fading, and hence it is realistic to expect an increase of say one 
point in the equilibrium inflation rate. The second and related question is whether this 
should imply a different attitude of central banks, notably the ECB. I will argue that, 
besides the obvious implication that the target inflation rate should be raised for 
credibility reasons, the structural factors behind the increase of inflation, and the 
consequences in terms of aggregate welfare and income distribution should be 
addressed by monetary policy and fiscal policy alike. 
The surge in oil prices, accompanied by a surge in food prices, has had the expected 
effect of increasing headline inflation all over the world. But since already some 
decades, the message of the analysis of Michael Bruno and Jeffrey Sachs has well 
been understood: an oil shock would lead to an episode of stagflation in a context 
where wage indexation is pervasive. So almost everywhere in advanced countries 
wage indexation has disappeared from the economic scene, as both the stability of 
core inflation and the stagnation of real wages seems to indicate. 
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Hence this time the oil tax has mainly fallen on the shoulders of the wage earners. In 
the language of the ECB it seems, at least until now, not to have had second rank 
effects. But this type of adaptation to a supply shock has necessarily a growth effect: 
the slowing down of consumption and its subsequent effect on investment is reducing 
the rate of growth almost everywhere. This is a first “disinflation” factor 
characterizing the present situation. A second factor has to be found in the reversal of 
oil prices (at least their levelling off) and the reversal of food prices whose surge was 
in part due to specific factors not likely to replicate in the future. 
According to this appraisal, the causes behind inflation have had their maximum 
effect in 2008. It has to be recalled that from July 2007 and July 2008, oil prices have 
more than doubled and since the July peak, they are decreasing (with some 
fluctuations). The same is true for the bulk of commodity prices. Inflation is thus 
expected to recede in the year to come in advanced economies. Some economists are 
also arguing that there is another factor behind the increase in commodity prices, 
namely the financial crisis: when financial assets prices would have decreased enough, 
the expectation of their return to normal will add a further deflationary effect on 
commodity prices.  
For all these reasons the fear of stagflation – the synchronous increase of the rates of 
inflation and unemployment – seems to be grossly exaggerated.  
But this does not amount to saying that monetary policy is not confronted with a 
problem. It is certainly in emerging and developing economies where oil, food and 
other commodities account for a much larger fraction of the Consumer price index. 
But it is also in advanced economies because the global context is exhibiting a 
noticeable and foreseeable change. Globalization has had and continues to have the 
expected beneficial effect in favouring growth in the developing countries which have 
chosen a growth strategy based on openness to trade. As a consequence, the world is 
becoming more balanced, and the period of abnormally cheap exports which has 
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helped to lower the equilibrium rate of inflation in the western world is progressively 
coming to an end .That process will take still some more decades to be accomplished, 
but already the discrepancy between the terms of trade of the advanced economies 
and the emerging countries is slowly reducing. Moreover, the process is already 
sufficiently advanced, that absent radical technological progress, the pressure on the 
price of exhaustible resources will continue to increase. 
 
 
 
1. Are We Experiencing an Increase in the Equilibrium Inflation Rate? 
 
Figures 1 and 2 report the evolution of global commodity indexes from the Dow 
Jones and the Economist respectively, together with selected subcategories.  
 
Figure 1 shows an impressive increase of energy prices since the beginning of 2008 to 
the peak of July (more than 70%), but also an equally impressive decrease (almost 
30%) during the month of August. These fluctuations drove the average index as well. 
 
Fig 1 - Dow Jones Price Index (2007=100)
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Similarly, figure 2 shows that without food, the price index increase was not dramatic, 
while food prices almost doubled from January 2007 to the peak of last July. 
 
Thus, we can observe three major stylized facts. The first is an upward trend of the 
price level. The second is an increasing variability, with fluctuations easily above 
10% from one month to the other. And the third is a very unequal distribution across 
commodities and sectors, with commonly used commodities (food, energy) 
increasing significantly more than the average. 
 
In Fitoussi and Gergescu-Roegen (1980), we linked the equilibrium level of inflation 
to the structure of the economy. That paper noticed how asymmetric price behaviour 
may be a natural consequence of uncertainty, that pushes prudent entrepreneurs to 
prefer price adjustments to quantity adjustments (i.e., new capacity building) when 
observing increases in demand. The degree of asymmetry increase with uncertainty, 
and there is little doubt that in a period of financial crisis uncertainty becomes 
pervasive.  In sectors experiencing excess supply, price adjustments are much more 
difficult to achieve as they are constrained by institutions in general, and social ones 
in particular. This asymmetry on the price dimension is mirrored by a converse 
asymmetry in the quantity dimension, i.e., quantity adjustments are stronger in sectors 
characterized by excess supplies. Price behaviour asymmetry determines a positive 
inflation rate in equilibrium (i.e. when aggregate demand and supply are equal) 
because prices increase in sectors with excess demands more than they decrease in 
sectors with excess supply. An important consequence of this definition of 
equilibrium inflation is that for a given average excess demand (say zero), increased 
variance at the sector level implies an increase in the equilibrium inflation rate. The 
 Fig 2 - Economist Price Index (2007=100)
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data below show clearly than something of this kind (increased dispersion) is a 
characteristic of the present period. Another mechanism by which sector 
heterogeneity brings about a positive equilibrium inflation rate is the tendency for 
wages to move together, while productivity growth is very different between sectors 
(lower for example in the services sector). 
 
Whatever its origin, this link between average inflation and the structural differences 
across sectors becomes important in light of the stylized facts analyzed above. 
 
For reasons already developed, we should not observe further increases in the rate of 
inflation, quite the contrary. The consensus for the Euro area is for example of an 
inflation rate that should stabilize around 3% by the end of 2008. 
 
Nevertheless, a detailed analysis of the factors that determined the path of inflation in 
the past pushes to believe that the abnormally low inflation levels of the past will not 
be easily found again. At minimum the rate of inflation could exhibit in the future 
much more volatility.  
 
At the basis of the era of low (and relatively stable) inflation that we experienced 
since at least two decades is the globalization process that had its more visible aspects 
in the fast integration of emerging economies (notably China and India) in the world 
economy. This led to what Freeman (2005) called the “great doubling” of the global 
labour force, that had strong deflationary effects. In the Briefing paper that I prepared 
for the EP in December 2007, I mentioned a number of factors that at different levels 
explained the tendency of global inflation to decrease. I report them here for the 
reader’s convenience:  
1. The more straightforward is the direct effect of cheap imports, which reduces the 
overall price level. This effect is larger for countries that have a higher share of 
imports in domestic consumption. 
2. Related to the former, there is the substitution effect of cheaper imports for 
domestic goods. According to the ECB monthly bulletin, of August 2006, China 
and new member states have seen their exports to old member countries of the EU 
double from 1995 to 2004. 
3. Trade openness has also an effect on domestic prices, through the downward 
pressure that it exerts on wages of sectors more exposed to foreign competition. 
The threat of delocalization and of outsourcing has been used to moderate wage 
growth and to keep labour costs low. 
4. A global economy also tends to reduce bottlenecks and capacity constraints, thus 
reducing the sensitivity of inflation to domestic supply problems. Supply and 
demand are increasingly determined at a global scale. 
5. Increased competition implies a process of selection in the domestic market, with 
less efficient firms that will be driven out of business. This implies an increase in 
overall productivity and a decrease of prices. 
6. Finally, even when the share of imports is low, and hence the direct effect plays a 
limited role in affecting inflation, the simple threat coming from potential 
competitors will force domestic producers to keep prices low. The notion of 
market contestability, introduced by Will Baumol in oligopoly theory, fully 
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applies to international trade, and explains why the reduction of inflation also 
appeared in relatively closed economies (like the US for example). 
 
The briefing paper of December 2007 considered also the two apparently opposed 
views of Lawrence Ball (2006) and Kenneth Rogoff (2004). The first argues that most 
of the effects of globalization on inflation are temporary, in the sense that they are 
linked to the current transition towards a more integrated world, which pushes prices 
downwards. Once the transition accomplished, concludes Ball, inflation will go back 
to more reasonable levels. Rogoff argues that Globalization has modified so deeply 
the economic environment that inflationary pressures are today permanently lower 
than in the past (notably through the increased competition that makes prices and 
wages more flexible). Both opinions seem to be correct but they are referring to two 
distinct mechanisms. Ball refers mainly to the effect of globalization on income – and 
the end of the terms of “trade’s rent” – Rogoff to the effect of the dismantling of the 
barriers to trade on competition.  
 
It is my opinion that we have already seen most of the second effect, and that the first 
(the Ball effect) will dominate in the future. The consequences of the huge structural 
shock represented by the big doubling are inevitably beginning to fade, as the 
generalized wage increases in China’s urban areas witness. The balance between 
satisfying external and internal demand will certainly progressively change in china. 
In the next few years the deflationary effects of emerging economies’ participation to 
the global trade system will be reduced. Furthermore, the delocalization of production 
to low wage countries in the past has created an excess capacity, that on one side 
helped to keep prices low, and on the other induced firms to close production units in 
rich countries. Now that emerging economies are growing richer and increase their 
demand, we are heading towards less excess capacity. 
 
A second important factor is that the increasing wealth of emerging economies 
increases demand (both for consumption and for production) of scarce and 
exhaustible resources like energy and food. This effect is for the moment weak and 
there is some debate among economists about its responsibility in the increase in the 
prices of commodities. Some for example would argue that the increase in the 
Chinese demand for oil between 2005 and 2008 represents 1% of total oil demand 
(and less than half of this amount for India) and can’t thus explain the huge increase 
of oil prices. But in an oligopoly market where supply is controlled by producers, a 
marginal increase of demand may have huge effect on prices. And whatever the past 
this effect will certainly gain momentum in the future, and will contribute to a large 
increase of the rent of the owners of these goods.  
 
A distinct argument is that the attempts of advanced countries to weaken their 
dependency on exhaustible resources and to respond to the increased demand of clean 
environment by their population may contribute to increase inflation pressures: 
climate change policies may in effect impose higher prices in energy and energy-
intensive goods and services. So what? Should we in order to avoid transitory 
increase in the equilibrium inflation rate, or in its volatility, renounce to invest in the 
future and especially in new technologies of environment and energy? If these 
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investments prove profitable their effects on energy productivity will in the medium 
to long run decrease the pressure on prices. Moreover, there may be here a 
measurement problem: the increase in headline inflation consecutive to these policies 
may well reflect a quality effect because it affects positively the welfare of the people.  
 
Finally, a sometimes ignored feature of globalization is the restructuring of the 
economy, which implies the reallocation across sectors of demand and productive 
capacity. During this process the variance of excess demands and supplies increases 
and the equilibrium inflation rate with it. This effect will of course become less 
important as the restructuring comes to an end, but it is likely to play an important 
role in the next years. 
 
Thus, pressure for inflation to increase so as to reach a new equilibrium level (albeit 
still low) will come from rents, from price adjustment asymmetries, from climate 
change policies and from the reduction of excess capacity and excess supply of labour. 
This effect will be mitigated by a probable reduction in profit margins – which are at 
a very high level today as a consequence of the “great doubling”– as it is normal 
when the labour market is exhibiting a tendency towards a vanishing excess supply of 
labour. It has to be reminded as shown in the following graph that the share of wages 
in value added has decreased since the middle of the eighties, and has still decreased 
in the more recent period. That means it exists some room of manoeuvre for this share 
to rise in the future without creating inflationary pressures. 
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2. What Implications for Monetary Policy? 
  
If the analysis above were correct, the most immediate and obvious consequence 
would be the necessity of an upwards revision of the ECB target. I already argued in 
the past (Fitoussi (2002)) that the 2% objective had been chosen in a period of 
abnormally low inflation, and that we risked experiencing excessively restrictive 
monetary policy because of that. This argument is even stronger today: last July the 
ECB raised its rates of a quarter of a point, while the Euro zone was experiencing the 
first period of negative (quarter to quarter) growth. A too low inflation target may 
lead to a backward looking monetary policy! 
 
More generally, in a situation in which some goods exhibit important price increases 
due to structural factors, the only hope to avoid an increase in the general price level 
lies in the capacity for policy to be able to reduce the price level in other sectors, in 
order to compensate. I see two different ways to obtain this objective.  
The first is a policy mix (low interest rates and targeted fiscal measures) able to 
facilitate investment and productivity growth in some sectors, thus lowering unit 
labour costs and prices. 
 
The second is a policy mix aimed at reducing inflationary pressures through brakes 
on aggregate demand. The current policies carried out today in Europe are leading to 
a contractionary policy mix. The fear of second round effects, that I discussed at 
length in my briefing paper of December 2007, pushes the ECB to keep interest rates 
high in order to avoid wage increases, even when most of today’s inflation is 
imported. This has the consequence of compressing real wages, a phenomenon that 
all European countries experienced, albeit with different intensities. 
 
This strategy has undesirable contractionary consequences, and makes the burden of 
adjustment fall disproportionately on the shoulders of low and middle income 
households, as I will highlight below. But more importantly, it is not necessarily 
effective. The asymmetric behaviour of prices implies that, the generalized decrease 
in demand will call for an adjustment on quantities rather than on prices, and hence 
will be unable to compensate fully the increase of prices in the energy sector. This 
mechanism is the core of the increasing risk of entering a stagflation phase. But as 
said below the likely reversal of commodity prices increases make this risk more 
remote.  
 
Thus, a policy of high rates and exclusive focus on inflation targeting do not seem to 
be the appropriate response to the current transition towards a slightly higher 
equilibrium rate of inflation, because they are likely to depress the economy while 
being ineffective to fight inflation. 
 
If the above diagnosis is correct, what we need is a policy aimed at facilitating the 
restructuring of the economy, and at addressing the increasing variance of sector 
disequilibria. Monetary policy alone could not accomplish this task, and coordination 
with other policy tools (fiscal policy, competition policy, industrial policy) becomes 
necessary. 
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The situation is further complicated by the increasing income inequality that makes 
average inflation less and less significant. The dispute on perceived inflation may be 
partly explained along these lines. The unequal price increase impacts the different 
income brackets differently. More specifically, energy and food enter in a 
disproportionately large share in the consumption basket of lower income brackets, 
which as a consequence experience a larger loss of purchasing power. Nobody 
recognizes himself in an average figure in a context of growing inequalities. As a 
consequence the statistical apparatus that we currently use may become too abstract 
to correspond to perceptions.  
 
Thus income inequality should also be targeted by policy, because for a given average 
rate of inflation, the negative effects are larger when income is more dispersed. 
Furthermore; an important consequence of increasing inequality is the accumulation 
of large liquidities in the hands of a few households. This inevitably has an impact on 
speculative movements, asset price inflation etc., which may be a major cause of 
concern for monetary policy. Hence the argument according to which the excessively 
high growth of monetary aggregates may be finally translating into consumer prices 
may be misleading. As argued in a former briefing paper excess liquidity may well be 
the symptom of excess saving due to a set of reasons: increasing inequalities, 
increased rents (high commodities prices), huge current account surplus in emerging 
countries etc… Thus “excess liquidity” is likely to affect much more asset prices than 
consumer prices.  
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